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Abstract 
The shift from probabilistic to possibilistic risk management characterises 
contemporary cultural attitudes towards uncertainty. This shift in attitude is 
paralleled by the growing influence of the belief that future risks are not only 
unknown but are also unknowable. Scepticism about the capacity of 
knowledge to help manage risks has encouraged the dramatisation of 
uncertainty. One consequence of this development has been the advocacy of 
a precautionary response to threats. This article examines the way in which 
precautionary attitudes have shaped the response to the threat of terrorism 
and to the millennium bug. The main accomplishment of this response has 
been to intensify the sense of existential insecurity 
1 Introduction 
On the very day that Mumbai came under attack by small groups of mobile 
gunmen, newspaper headlines in Britain were informing the public that a 
terrorist strike could infect the country with bird flu. This scenario was 
contained in a report published by the Institute of Public Policy Research’s 
Commission of National Security for the 21st century. This document specu- 
lated that the threat from pandemic diseases such as SARS and Avian Flu is 
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growing all the time, and because of inadequate preparation ‘a serious 
disease outbreak or bio-terrorism incident in the next 18 months could tip the 
global economy from serious recession into global depression’. In line with 
current Hollywood fantasy plot lines, the report invited us to imagine the 
possibility of a terrorist purchasing ‘genes for use in engineering of an 
existing and dangerous pathogen into a more virulent strain’.1 A day after the 
publication of this report, a panel of experts informed the American 
Congress that a biological terrorist attack on the nation was likely by 2013. 
‘The consequences of a biological attack are almost beyond comprehension’ 
noted former Senator Bob Graham before adding that ‘it would be 9/11 
times 10 or a hundred in terms of the number of people who would be 
killed’.2 Both of these threat assessments are based on a precautionary logic 
that dominates contemporary risk management. This article argues that the 
institutionalisation of this logic is underpinned by a shift from probabilistic 
to possibilistic risk analysis. 
A speculative orientation towards the future is intrinsic to 
precautionary thinking. Precautionary culture, which has a powerful 
influence on risk management, is ambiguous about the status of knowledge 
in assessing risk.3 Through encouraging policy-making and action on the 
basis of what we do not yet know, it encourages the kind of worst-case 
thinking that underpins the war against terror or the panic about the 
millennium bug and environmental problems. 
2 Unknown and unknowable 
Western society’s culture of fear signals the idea that contemporary risks are 
qualitatively more dangerous than previous ones because we know very little 
about them. There is a growing body of opinion among academic risk 
experts and risk managers that suggests that what we have to worry about is 
not simply a future that is unknown but one that is unknowable. Throughout 
history, societies have tended to be apprehensive about uncertainty and have 
feared the unknown. But the way that communities respond to uncertainty 
fluctuates in line with how much at ease a society is with itself and how 
confident it feels about its future. Historically, an intense consciousness of 
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uncertainty expresses the realisation that it is not possible to know what will 
happen in the future. Although experience and knowledge provide insights 
into likely developments and outcomes, the future always contains an 
element of the unknown.  
How people respond to the unknown is subject to historical and 
cultural variations.  There are times when people’s response to the unknown 
is one of excitement, curiosity, inquisitiveness and eager anticipation. These 
are moments when people adopt a robust and optimistic sensibility towards 
the unknown. European sailors setting out to discover an unknown world 
and enthusiastic space travellers in the 1960s embraced the challenge of 
turning the unknown into the knowable. From this standpoint, uncertainty 
served as a stimulus to the positive act of discovery. At other times, 
communities respond with anxiety to uncertainty and regard the unknown as 
merely a threat to avoid rather than as an opportunity for discovery. In these 
circumstances, fear and dread express the dominant mood towards 
uncertainty. Today this response to the unknown has acquired an un-
precedented significance.  
One of the defining features of our times is that anxiety about the 
unknown appears to have a greater significance than the fear of known 
threats. Politicians and campaigners often hint darkly about the grave 
challenge posed by threats that are perilous precisely because they are 
unknown. These are threats to which as yet we can give no name and whose 
trajectory cannot be calculated. One of Europe’s leading sociologists, 
Zygmunt Bauman, gives voice to this vision of unnamed threats when he 
states that ‘by far the most awesome and fearsome dangers are precisely 
those that are impossible or excruciatingly difficult to anticipate, the 
unpredicted, and in all likelihood unpredictable ones’.4
Bauman’s analysis is closely based on the work of the German 
sociologist Ulrich Beck, who argues that technological development has 
created a world where society simply cannot understand the destructive 
consequences of human intervention. Beck stated that  
through our past decisions about atomic energy and our present decisions about the 
use of genetic technology, human genetics, nanotechnology, and computer science, 
we unleash unforeseeable, uncontrollable, indeed even incommunicable
consequences that threaten life on earth.5  
The formulation ‘incommunicable consequences’ is used to highlight the 
claim that humanity lacks the intellectual resources with which to interpret 
future trends. Consequently, empirical evidence or analysis can provide little 
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assistance in this quest, since contemporary experience has little to say about 
an imagined or radically different future. 
The culture that has been described as the culture of fear or as 
precautionary culture encourages society to approach human experience as a 
potential risk to our safety.6 Consequently every conceivable experience has 
been transformed into a risk to be managed. One leading criminologist, 
David Garland, writes of the ‘Rise of Risk’ – the explosion in the growth of 
risk discourse and risk literature. He notes that little connects this literature 
other than the use of the word risk.7 However, the very fact that risk is used 
to frame a variety of otherwise unconnected experiences reflects a taken-for-
granted mood of uncertainty towards human experience. In contemporary 
society, little can be taken for granted other than an apprehensive response 
towards uncertainty. Arguably, like risk, fear has become a taken-for-granted 
idiom, even a cultural affectation for expressing confusion and uncertainty. 
The French social theorist Francois Ewald believes that the ascendancy of 
this precautionary sensibility is underwritten by a cultural mood that 
assumes the uncertainty of causality between action and effect. This 
sensibility endows fear with a privileged status. Ewald suggests that the 
institutionalisation of precaution ‘invites one to consider the worst 
hypothesis (defined as the “serious and irreversible” consequence) in any 
business decision’.8 The tendency to engage with uncertainty through the 
prism of fear and therefore anticipate the worst possible outcome can be 
understood as a crisis of causality. Riezler in his early attempt to develop a 
psychology of fear draws attention to the significant influence of the 
prevailing system of causality on people’s response to threats. ‘They have 
been taken for granted – and now they are threatened’ is how he describes a 
situation where ‘“causes” are hopelessly entangled’.9 As noted previously, 
the devaluation of people’s capacity to know has significant influence on the 
way that communities interpret the world around them. Once the authority of 
knowledge is undermined, people become hesitant about interpreting new 
events. Without the guidance of knowledge, world events can appear as 
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random and arbitrary acts that are beyond comprehension. This crisis of 
causality does not simply deprive society from grasping the chain of events 
that has led to a particular outcome; it also diminishes the capacity to find 
meaning in what sometimes appears as a series of patternless events.  
The question of causation is inextricably bound up with the way 
communities attempt to make sense of acts of misfortune. The way people 
interpret such events – an accident or a catastrophe – is processed through 
the prevailing system of meaning. Questions like ‘was it God’ or ‘was it 
nature’ or ‘was it an act of human error’ have important implications in 
terms of how we understand acts of misfortune. Today such questions are 
complicated by the fact that Western societies possess a weak sense of 
shared meaning and therefore often lack a consensus about how to attribute 
blame and responsibility. The absence of consensus means that the link 
between cause and negative outcome is continually contested. Confusion 
about causation encourages speculation, rumours, and mistrust. As a result, 
events often appear as incomprehensible and beyond human control.  
3 The ambiguities of knowing 
Disappointment with the promise of the Enlightenment has diminished 
public confidence in society’s ability to know, understand, and ultimately 
control the future. The view that we live in a world that is so complex as to 
render meaningless the claim to know is systematically promoted by radical 
critics of modernity. Critics are also worried that the advance of knowledge 
itself creates problems, because it threatens to encourage activity and 
behaviour whose consequences cannot be known in advance. This attitude is 
most forcefully expressed in the view that one of the products of science and 
knowledge is risk. Leading sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens 
forcefully argue the case for the close association between the sense of risk 
and the increase in knowledge. ‘Many of the uncertainties which face us 
today have been created by the very growth of knowledge’, wrote Giddens, 
and Beck has noted that the ‘sources of danger are no longer ignorance but 
knowledge’.10 In this scenario, knowledge through its application creates 
both new hazards and an awareness of their risk. From this standpoint the 
problem is not ignorance but knowledge that questions the authority of 
science. The implicit preference of ignorance over knowledge represents a 
contemporary variant of the conservative embrace of prejudice in the 19th 
century. In both cases, knowledge is perceived as undesirable because of its 
disruptive and disorienting effect.   
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The association of knowledge with risk is based on a model of 
society that feels uncomfortable with change and uncertainty, and regards 
technological development as potentially threatening. Such a society 
experiences the advance of knowledge and the unintended consequences of 
technological development as a source of anxiety and disorientation. These 
days, arguments that associate knowledge with risks are implicitly 
questioning the human potential for knowing. It is claimed that human 
knowledge cannot grasp the chaotic patterns of events set in motion by 
global capitalism, and the impossibility of knowing or calculating the 
consequences of technology and human action is widely insisted upon. This 
view is justified by the argument that technological development in a 
globalised environment has become so complex as to destroy the foundation 
for understanding the future. As a result, the German sociologist Nikolas 
Luhmann claims that ‘no one is in a position to claim knowledge of the 
future nor the capacity to change it’.11 For Luhmann, knowledge is restricted 
to providing insights into what has already happened, and limited insights at 
that. Consequently, the development of knowledge is not only perceived as 
potentially dangerous but it is also represented as having a limited value for 
guiding society towards the future. 
Historically, knowledge and science were upheld because of their 
capacity for transforming uncertainty into calculable risk. In recent times, 
this view of science has been undermined by a sensibility that stresses our 
inability to know. Often what is at issue is not just not knowing but the 
impossibility of knowing. The association of knowledge with potential 
danger is based on a self-consciously anti-Enlightenment intellectual 
outlook. In this model, knowledge and science are both limited in their grasp 
of the truth; and because they set in motion innovations that have unintended 
effects, they also create problems. Such an outlook is, of course, strongly 
shaped by the negative experience of political change in the 20th century. 
The failure of political experimentation in the Soviet Union and China, 
disappointment with the record of the Welfare State, and disenchantment 
with the promise of the Enlightenment is interpreted as direct proof that 
ambitious political programmes do not work; and, retrospectively, such 
negative experiences confirm that we simply do not know how to know. 
Thus, the authority of knowledge is further devalued. 
The preoccupation with uncertainty and risk does not lead explicitly 
to the rejection of knowledge. Rather, it helps to consolidate a mood that 
assigns to knowledge an essentially defensive role. From this precautionary 
perspective, knowledge is required to accommodate the prevailing climate of 
uncertainty and anxiety. The sense of powerlessness with which change is 
perceived has weakened people’s belief in the possibility of knowing what 
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lies ahead, reflected in the demand that ‘science must not run ahead of public 
opinion’, and the notion that the ethos of precaution must dictate the pace at 
which knowledge develops. The development of knowledge has always been 
subject to pragmatic concerns, but today such concerns have a distinctly 
defensive focus. And because the authority of knowledge has been 
compromised through experience, the argument that it should be allowed to 
be pursued for its own sake carries less conviction than in previous times. 
Time and again the public is informed that the most dreadful dangers 
are not just ones that we cannot predict or anticipate but ones about which 
we cannot say anything because they are literally unknown. Security analysts 
and military planners often refer to such threats as ‘unknown unknowns’. It 
was the former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who brought the 
concept unknown unknowns to the attention of a wider public. At a press 
briefing in February 2002 he astounded those in his audience when he stated:  
Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, 
because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. 
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some 
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns — the ones we don't 
know we don't know.12  
At the time, many commentators responded with a mixture of incredulity 
and hilarity to what they interpreted as Rumsfeld’s convoluted attempt to 
avoid accounting for the absence of information or evidence regarding Iraq’s 
alleged weapons of mass destruction programme. Others treated it as yet 
another example of dishonest double-speak. However, Rumsfeld’s 
comments convey an orientation towards the problems of the future that is 
widely shared by political and cultural elites on both sides of the Atlantic. 
As far as Rumsfeld is concerned, the problems of the future fall into 
three categories: firstly, they are ones that we know and understand (known 
knowns); secondly, they are ones that we know that we neither know nor 
understand (known unknowns); and thirdly, they are ones that we do not 
even know we do not know and understand. These are the unknown 
unknowns. The burden of Rumsfeld’s argument is that in the war against 
terrorism it is the unknown unknowns that constitute the greatest threat. 
From this standpoint the problem is not simply the absence of intelligence 
about a specific terrorist threat; it is a more fundamental quandary of not 
even possessing the capacity to know what the intelligence that is lacking 
should be about. The very frequency with which Rumsfeld and his 
colleagues use the suffix un is testimony not only to a lack of facts but of 
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meaning. A palpable sense of disorientation is transmitted by Rumsfeld 
when he states that ‘our challenge in this new century is a difficult one: to 
defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the 
unexpected’.13 Rumsfeld’s three-fold categorisation of risks also informs the 
work of the Office of Homeland Security. One of its risk managers defines 
unknown unknowns as ‘risks of which there is no awareness at the present 
time of their existence and effect’. Apparently one can do little to anticipate 
these risks other than put a ten percent contingency aside ‘without knowing 
exactly where this reserve will be applied’.14
An examination of official deliberations on the subject of terrorism 
indicates that the unknown has taken on a life of its own. The term does not 
simply mean strange, unfamiliar, or unidentified. It signifies a state or a 
condition. Indeed, it is treated as a distinct sphere of existence, a kind of 
parallel world that cannot be grasped through the workings of the human 
mind. Take the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the 
London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005. One of this report’s sections is 
actually titled ‘Reassessing “the Unknown”’. For the authors of this report, 
the unknown does not simply refer to the dearth of intelligence about a 
specific group or threat. The unknown has been transformed into a world for 
which we have no mental map. At several points the authors of the report are 
lost for words as they attempt to conceptualise the unknown. They note that 
the July 2005 bombings had ‘sharpened’ the perception of how big ‘the 
unknown’ was, since the Government knew next to nothing about home-
grown terrorism. They go on to acknowledge that the July attacks 
emphasised ‘how much was unknown by the police and the Security Service 
about ideologically motivated extremist activity at the local level’.15 What 
the report’s threat assessment could not accomplish was to provide a strategy 
for dealing with a problem that is unknowable. All that it could offer was to 
exhort the intelligence services to embark on a journey into the unknown.  It  
reported with approval that 
the Director-General of the Security Service told the Committee that the main lesson 
learned from the July attacks was the need to get into ‘the unknowns’ – to find ways 
of broadening coverage to pick up currently unknown terrorist activity or plots.16
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4 The consolidation of ‘what if’ thinking 
Rumsfeld’s deliberation on unknown unknowns resonates with a radically 
new orientation towards the perception and management of risks in Western 
societies. The traditional association of risk with probabilities is now 
contested by a growing body of opinion that believes that humanity lacks the 
knowledge to calculate them. Numerous critics of probabilistic thinking call 
for a radical break with past practices on the ground that we simply lack the 
information to calculate probabilities. Environmentalists have been in the 
forefront of constructing arguments that devalue probabilistic thinking. They 
claim that the long-term irreversible damage caused to the environment 
cannot be calculated and therefore a probability-based risk analysis is 
irrelevant. ‘The term “risk” is very often confused with “probability”, and 
hence used erroneously’ writes an opponent of genetic modification.17 Of 
course once risk is detached from probabilities it ceases to be a risk. Such 
phenomenon is no longer subject to calculation. Instead of risk assessment 
the use of intuition is called for. 
The emergence of a speculative approach towards risk is paralleled 
by the growing influence of possibilistic thinking, which invites speculation 
about what can possibly go wrong. In our culture of fear, frequently what 
can possibly go wrong is equated with what is likely to happen. 
The shift towards possibilistic thinking is driven by a powerful sense 
of cultural pessimism about knowing and an intense feeling of apprehension 
about the unknown. The cumulative outcome of this sensibility is the 
routinisation of the expectation of worst possible outcomes. The principal 
question posed by possibilistic thinking, ‘what can possibly go wrong’, 
continually invites the answer ‘everything’. The connection between 
possibilistic and worse-case thinking is self-consciously promoted by the 
advocates of this approach. The American sociologist Lee Clarke 
acknowledges that ‘worst case thinking is possibilistic thinking’ and that it is 
‘very different’ from the ‘modern approach to risk’ which is ‘based on 
probabilistic thinking’.18 However he believes that the kinds of dangers 
confronting humanity today require us to expect the worst and demand a 
different attitude towards risk. He claims that: 
Modern social organization and technologies bring other new opportunities to harm 
faraway people. Nuclear explosions, nuclear accidents, and global warming are 
examples. We are increasingly ‘at risk’ of global disasters, most if not all of which 
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qualify as worst cases.19
Warning us about ‘how vulnerable we are to worst case events’, Clarke 
concludes that ‘we ought to prepare for possible untoward events that are out 
of control and overwhelming’.20
Politicians and their officials have also integrated worse-case 
thinking into their response to terrorism and to other types of catastrophic 
threats. Appeals to the authority of risk assessment still play an important 
role in policy-making. However, the prevailing culture of fear dictates that 
probabilistic-led risk management constantly competes with and often gives 
way to possibilistic-driven worst-case policies. As an important study of 
Blair’s policy on terrorism notes, he combines an appeal to risk assessment 
with worse-case thinking. David Runciman, the author of this study, 
observed that in his response to the threat of terrorism, ‘Blair relied on 
expert risk assessment and on his own intuitions’. Runciman added that Blair 
‘highlighted the importance of knowing the risk posed by global terrorism, 
all the while insisting that when it comes to global terrorism the risks are 
never fully knowable’.21 In practice, the co-existence of these two forms of 
threat assessment tends to be resolved in favour of the possibilistic approach. 
The occasional demand for a restrained and low-key response to the risk of 
terrorism is overwhelmed by the alarmist narrative of a worse-case 
scenario.22
The swing from probabilistic to possibilistic thinking is closely 
linked to changing society-wide attitudes and perceptions of the future. The 
future is perceived increasingly as predetermined and independent of present 
human activities. It is an unknown world of hidden terror. The amplification 
of threat and of fear is inextricably linked with possibilistic thinking. As 
Lipschutz argues, the ‘paradox of unknowability’ leading to ‘worst case 
analysis’ reinforces the ‘narratives of fear’ of terrorism.23 The future of the 
world appears to be a far darker and frightening one when perceived through 
the prism of possibilities rather than probabilities. Probabilities can be 
calculated and managed, and adverse outcomes can be minimised. In 
contrast, worse-case thinking sensitises the imagination to just that – worst 
cases. Clarke acknowledges the contrast between these two ways of 
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perceiving the future. He notes that ‘if we imagine the future in terms of 
probabilities, then risks look safe’ but ‘if we imagine the future in terms of 
possibilities, however, horrendous scenarios appear’.24 While it is simplistic 
and inaccurate to suggest that probability analysis works towards portraying 
the future as safe, it is definitely true that worst-case thinking strives to 
highlight the worst. A possibilistic interpretation of problems works to 
normalise the expectation of worse possible outcomes and fosters a one-
sided and fatalistic consciousness of the future.  Why? Because it minimises 
the potential for understanding a threat. Since understanding is a pre-
condition for countering a problem, the declaration of ignorance intensifies a 
sense of impotence, which in turn augments the threat.  That is why alarmist 
campaigns that warn of unbounded dangers tend to embrace possibilistic 
thinking. ‘Consequential, possibilistic thinking has been commonplace 
among antinuclear activists and other environmentalists for years’, writes 
Clarke.25  Other interests advocating this approach are the counter-terrorism 
industry and fear entrepreneurs who actively promoted a mood of panic 
about the millennium bug. 
Probabilistic thinking has become an anathema to fear entrepreneurs 
because it offers a problem-solving and positive orientation towards 
calculating and managing risks and securing safety. Those who regard 
uncertainty with apprehension and dread experimentation and innovation 
depict probabilistic thinking as irresponsible and dangerous. This rejection 
of probabilities is motivated by the belief that the dangers that we face are so 
overwhelming and catastrophic that we simply cannot wait until we have the 
information to calculate their destructive effects. From this standpoint the 
procedure of acting on the basis of the worst-case scenario makes more 
sense than waiting for the information necessary to weigh up probabilities. 
In any case, it is argued that since so many of the threats are unknown, there 
is little information on which basis a realistic calculation of probabilities can 
be made. One of the many regrettable consequences of this procedure is that 
policies designed to deal with threats are increasingly based on feelings and 
intuition rather than on evidence or facts.  For example, a discussion paper 
published by Greenpeace is sceptical about using probabilistic thinking. It 
argues that ‘risk-based approaches simply equate “absence of evidence” of 
an impact with “evidence of absence” of that impact’. Yet they claim ‘all too 
often the absence of evidence flows simply from the limits of available 
scientific evaluation techniques’.26 According to critics of probabilistic 
thinking, the absence of evidence regarding human impact on the 
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environment should not influence decision-making based on worst-case 
thinking. 
The scepticism that some environmentalist thinkers express towards 
the authority of evidence is echoed by proponents of a pre-emptive strike 
against potential enemies. It is worth noting that after his pronouncement on 
unknown unknowns, Rumsfeld responded to a question about whether he 
had any evidence about Iraq supplying weapons of mass destruction to 
terrorists by stating that ‘the absence of evidence is not an evidence of 
absence’.27 From the worst-case perspective, military action does not require 
authentication of evidence. For Rumsfeld, ignorance or not knowing can be a 
spur to action. And the very absence of evidence served as a valid clue with 
regard to a hidden, invisible military threat that justified military action. 
Since possibilistic thinking presents the future through the prism of 
worst-case scenario, it creates a demand for immediate action. In this 
catastrophic perspective there is no time to wait for evidence. The entirely 
unknown quality of the threat is itself proof of the danger ahead. That is 
why, instead of properly evaluated evidence, worse-case thinking is often the 
driver of anti-terrorist policy. The anticipation of catastrophic consequences 
continually demands that something be done. As Durodie explained, ‘act 
now, find the evidence later’ is the imperative driving this form of 
thinking.28 The logic of worst-case thinking is used by the US Government 
to justify the adoption of its pre-emptive security strategy. According to this 
doctrine  
the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling 
the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.29  
US officials frequently argue that they cannot wait until they have proof of 
some catastrophic threat, since by that time action would be too late. As 
President Bush argued,  
America must not ignore the threat gathering against us … we cannot wait for the 
final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.30  
And he added that ‘we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have 
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an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring’. Anticipating the worst 
rather than weighing up the risks also informed the approach of the Blair 
regime. ‘This is not a time to err on the side of caution; nor time to weigh the 
risks to an infinite balance’ declared Blair.31
The security policies associated with possibilistic thinking have been 
accurately interpreted as the application of the precautionary principle to 
terrorism by a group of critical scholars.32 Advocates of the possibilistic 
approach, such as Clarke, explicitly endorse the precautionary principle. He 
believes that ‘we may find that the precautionary principle is most useful for 
urging policy-makers to try to think about unexpected interactions and 
unintended consequences’.33 The Precautionary Principle that Clarke 
characterises as ‘quintessentially worst case thinking’ claims action should 
be taken to protect the environment even if there is no evidence of harm. The 
Precautionary Principle, which has been adopted by the EU, states that when 
confronted with uncertainty and possible destructive outcomes it is always 
better to err on the side of caution. A similar pre-occupation informed the 
advice of the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy when it 
proposed that ‘some version’ of the Precautionary Principle should be found 
a place in the Constitution.34 As Stern and Wiener explain, ‘the Precau- 
tionary Principle holds that uncertainty is no excuse for inaction against 
serious or irreversible risks’ and that the absence of evidence should not bar 
preventive action.35 This perspective informed the approach of the European 
Environment Agency when it insisted in January 2002 that ‘forestalling 
disasters usually requires acting before there is strong proof of harm’.36 The 
translation of this approach in the ‘war against terrorism’ is pre-emptive 
warfare, justified by Bush’s claim that the US cannot hold back military 
action until there is ‘the final proof’. 
In their discussion of the legitimating role of the Precautionary 
Principle for justifying the war in Iraq, Stern and Wiener show the similarity 
of the language used by advocates of EU environmental regulation and 
American supporters of the war on terror. Bush’s warning that if ‘we wait 
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for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long’ echoes the EU’s 
Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstorm’s statement that ‘if you smell 
smoke, you don’t wait until your house is burning down before you tackle 
the cause’.37 In both cases the language of caution is used to minimise the 
status of evidence. The intuitively arrived-at conclusion that the threat is far 
too great to wait for leads to the exhortation for immediate action. 
The precautionary approach does not necessarily encourage cautious 
behaviour. In its search for worst-case scenarios, it continually raises the 
stakes and fuels the demand for action. If as in the case of terrorism we fear 
the worst, then swift action is called for. As Aradau and van Munster note, 
the precautionary principle ‘privileges a politics of speed based on the 
sovereign decision of dangerousness’.38 In the domain of security policy, it 
promotes a highly interventionist and pre-emptive approach. Paradoxically, a 
casual approach towards caution is implicit in policies underpinned by a 
precautionary approach towards managing uncertainty. 
Jessica Stern has characterised the interventionist imperative 
contained within the precautionary approach as that of ‘action bias’. She 
argues that, perversely, the ‘precautionary approach as applied to Iraq has 
made the world more dangerous and more uncertain’.39 The 
institutionalisation of worst-case thinking through official policy is 
constantly defended on the ground that the stakes are so high that something 
must be done. ‘The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction’ 
observes the US Government’s 2002 National Security Strategy assessment. 
It also notes that ‘if we wait for threats to fully materializes, we will have 
waited too long’.40 Outwardly this call for military action bears all the 
hallmarks of an aggressive militarist ethos. But a close examination of the 
doctrine indicates an intense sense of defensiveness and anxiety towards a 
threat of catastrophic dimension. 
The precautionary approach towards the danger of terrorism is 
justified on the ground that it represents a threat to our existence. In light of 
such a grave threat, policy-makers feel entitled to abandon traditional forms 
of evidence-based policy-making. As Runciman writes: 
The trouble with the precautionary principle is that it purports to be a way of 
evaluating risk, yet it insists that some risks are simply not worth weighing in the 
balance. This could only make sense if it were true that some risks are entirely off 
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the scale of our experience of danger.41
However, if the threat of terrorism is perceived as beyond society’s capacity 
to manage, it has come close to triumphing over its targets. One of the 
unfortunate consequences of the worst-case approach is that it inflates the 
power of terrorism. And once terrorism is depicted as a threat of such cosmic 
proportions, every precautionary act becomes justifiable. As Stern argues, 
one disturbing consequence of this perspective has been ‘the temptation to 
imagine that the threats we face are so extreme that ordinary moral norms 
and laws do not apply’.42
5 Running riot with possibilistic thinking: the case of the millennium 
bug 
Possibilistic thinking has emerged as a distinctive feature of 21st-century life 
style.  During the year leading up to the new Millennium, there were 
ominous hints about the dreadful hazards that lay ahead. In the late 1990s, 
experts warned that at midnight on 31 December 1999, there would be 
problems with computer programmes, which would behave as if it were 
1900 instead of 2000. Concern with a potential technical glitch called the 
Millennium Bug swiftly turned into a powerful scare about the breakdown of 
the computer system.  At the time, industry experts, public officials, and 
politicians perceived the Y2K bug as the very embodiment of unknown 
unknowns. They regarded the ‘unknown unknowns out there’ with dread, 
and frequently used the term to highlight the apocalyptic dimension of 
humanity’s transition to the 21st century. As Quigley wrote, both the 
American and British governments ‘described the problem as vast and 
dangerous using the most dramatic terms’.43 Many saw the Y2Kbug as a 
paradigmatic unknown unknown. ‘The full impact of the Year 2000 has 
always been and is now wrapped up in the domain of unknown unknowns’, 
claimed a leading computer scientist.44
During the years leading up to 2000, there were numerous 
predictions about the massive disruptions that would be caused by the Bug. 
The mood of alarm and anxiety with which some people anticipated what 
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would happen at the stroke of midnight on 31 December 1999, indicated that 
age-old millennial apprehensions could still influence modern societies. It 
reminded some of the epidemic of fear that haunted European society a 
thousand year earlier in 999; when religious fanatics prophesised that the 
world would come to an end, the scene was set for the Last Judgment. The 
flames of terror caught the imagination of hundreds of thousands of people 
who waited for the coming Apocalypse.45  
 A thousand years later, millennial anxieties assumed a high-tech 
form. Religious preachers prophesised a future where widespread computer 
failures would unleash a cataclysmic struggle between good and evil. A 
group of American religious activists calling themselves Concerned 
Christians looked forward to an Arab-Israeli War that would give rise to a 
cycle of violence leading to Armageddon. Prominent American 
televangelists like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson predicted massive 
computer disruptions that would lead to disasters. One of their colleagues, 
Morris Cerullo, a Pentecostal healing revivalist, prophesised a catastrophe of 
biblical proportions: 
This panic that will sweep the nation will translate into a global depression. 
Shutdowns of banks will paralyze the world’s financial markets. Global economies 
will crash ... the Bible predicts an end day when the world will see a global 
economic crash in one hour! Riots will break out in cities … at the tick of midnight, 
2000, America could be less than thirty minutes away from nuclear devastation.46
Numerous alarmist publications cashed in on the panic and invented the 
most fantastic and frightening scenarios. One book, Time Bomb 2000, 
predicted that Y2K would lead to global chaos. Grant Jeffrey’s The 
Millennium Meltdown: the Year 2000 Computer Crisis prophesised a 
computer meltdown that would set the stage for the rise of a conspiratorial 
world government of the Antichrist. The title of Richard Wiles’ Judgment 
Day 2000; How the Coming Worldwide Computer Crash will Radically 
Change Your Life summed up the formidable dimension of the threat. 
Alarmist warnings about the impending catastrophe were forcefully 
transmitted by Michael Hyatt in his The Millennium Bug; How to Survive the 
Coming Chaos. This book provided a frightening vision of a world where air 
traffic would come to a standstill, military defence systems collapse, banking 
and credit facilities cease to operate, and power and electricity fail to 
function. This point was echoed by the Christian Coalition. A retired 
minister, Tim LaHaye, warned that Y2K could ‘trigger a financial 
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meltdown’ that would lead to ‘an international depression, which would 
make it possible for the Antichrist or his emissaries to establish a one-world 
economic system, which will dominate the world commercially until it is 
destroyed’. 
Scaremongering about Y2K was not confined to millennial cults and 
groups of religious zealots. Leading politicians and business leaders 
portrayed the problem as a threat of disastrous proportions.  The New York 
Times reported that ‘it makes sense to prepare for the worst’ since ‘lack of 
attention could be crippling’. The cover of one American magazine asked 
‘Could two measly digits really halt civilisation?’ and replied ‘Yes, yes – 
2000 times yes!’ Dr Edward Yardeni, a well known Wall Street economist, 
claimed that the millennium bug could cause a famine in the US because of 
the threat it posed to America’s highly networked agricultural sector.  
Yardeni urged his business audiences to regard the threat as a coming war. 
Many leading policy-makers and business people took it upon themselves to 
raise the public’s awareness of this threat. Dr Douglass Carmichael, a 
Pentagon consultant, stated that if  the worst-case scenario materialised ‘we 
could not rule out that social collapse would turn us into Rwanda, a Bosnia, 
a worldwide spasm of social reaction grasping for power and control’. James 
Adams, the former CEO of United Press International launched, a Y2K 
website to ‘sound a public wake up call’. 
Indeed, it is striking that many businessmen, corporate executives, 
and computer consultants were no less alarmist in their predictions than were 
zealous religious preachers. Some of them predicted that the cost of fixing 
this problem was so high that it would destabilise the world economy and 
lead to a recession. Publications with titles like, THE COMPUTER TIME 
BOMB: HOW TO KEEP THE CENTURY DATE CHANGE FROM KILLING 
YOUR ORGANIZATION transmitted the message of fear whilst also making 
a sales pitch.  The Millennium Bug scare helped produce a thriving fear 
market in promoting services to fix the problem. Companies peddling 
millennium-bug-related services were in the forefront of scaremongering. 
One American business, The Gartner group, predicted that 30 per cent of 
companies worldwide would experience some critical software failure 
because of YK2. Consultancies claimed that the damage caused by an 
impending computer crash would run into trillions of dollars. 
The scale of this major internationally co-ordinated effort and the 
massive expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars to deal with possible 
technologically induced crisis were unprecedented. Only a tiny minority of 
IT experts were prepared to question those devoted to constructing and 
inflating the ‘millennium bug problem’.47 Even social scientists, who usually 
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make an effort to interrogate exaggerated claims about an impending 
disaster, failed to raise any probing questions. One IT industry commentator, 
Larry Seltzer, noted that ‘looking back on the scale of the exaggeration, I 
have to think that there was a lot of deception going on’. He added that the 
‘motivation – mostly consulting fees – was all too obvious’. Nevertheless, it 
was not simply about money. Seltzer believes that there were also a lot of 
experienced people with no financial interest who deeply believed it was a 
real problem.48
The YK2 experience shows that precautionary delusions about 
impending disasters can exact colossal financial costs. Some cynics have 
argued that scaremongering about a technical glitch served as a job creation 
scheme. For example, David Starr, chief information officer of the Reader’s 
Digest Association, portrayed the hype over Y2K as the ‘biggest fraud 
perpetrated by consultants on the business community since re-engineering’. 
But the fantasies that surrounded Y2K also influenced the thinking of 
hardened entrepreneurs. As a result, insurance companies sought to cover 
themselves and some of them excluded Y2K cover because of the perception 
that it posed an unacceptable level of risk. Lloyds of London announced that 
it would not insure any ship without certification of Y2K compliance.  
When worst-case thinking captures the public’s imagination, there is 
always a price to pay.  In the case of the millennium bug, it is possible to see 
that the main accomplishment of precautionary thinking was the 
transformation of technical problems into apocalyptic threats. This was a 
threat that swiftly mutated from a technical problem into a peril that 
appeared to threaten the global economy and according to some account 
human existence. Many who were not influenced by evangelical preachers 
and did not interpret the problem as a form of divinely ordained punishment 
nevertheless feared the consequences of the coming disaster.  
6 The philosophy of the fear entrepreneur 
Possibilistic thinking succeeds in transmitting the philosophy of fear 
entrepreneurs in a coherent form. This form of thinking successfully captures 
and expresses the dominant mood of cultural pessimism. In the name of 
directing the public’s attention to its worst fears, it adopts a cavalier stance 
towards the authority of knowledge and of evidence. A philosophy that 
objectifies the idea that the absence of evidence is not an evidence of 
absence conveys the proposition that acting on the basis of an absence of 
evidence is as valid as evidence-based action. Indeed this proposition 
provides the rationale for the sentiment that it is precisely the absence of 
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evidence that constitutes the proof that precautionary action needs to be 
taken. This enthronement of ignorance has been described as ‘you never 
knowism’ by two critics of worst-case thinking. Friedman and Sapolsky 
explain that ‘You Never Knowism earns its name from its insistence on 
planning around what we do not know rather than what we do’.49
The significance that precautionary anti-terrorism attaches to the 
status of the unknown has the pernicious consequence of systematically 
devaluing the status of knowledge. It exhorts society to take what we do not 
know as seriously as what we do. Indeed it sometimes appears that what we 
do not know plays a greater role in influencing policy-makers than what we 
do know. Furthermore, by suggesting that many future threats are 
unknowable it fundamentally calls into question people’s capacity to reason 
and to understand. Not knowing or ignorance become as much a driver of 
policy as hard-won evidence. As the experience of the Millennium Bug 
showed, the precautionary approach displaces evidence-based policy with 
revelation-based calls to action. What is unknown is not an obstacle to 
action. Apprehension about the unknown continually invites action that is 
oriented towards the worst case. 
Worse-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as of one of 
the dominant principles around which the public, its government, and 
institutions should organise their life. It institutionalises insecurity and 
fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularising the 
belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenceless and 
vulnerable to a wide range of future threats. In all but name it constitutes an 
invitation to terror. The elevation of terrorism into an existential threat is one 
of the disturbing accomplishments of precautionary-driven policies. Once 
the threat of terrorism is perceived according to the possibilistic paradigm, 
real live terrorists do not have to do very much to achieve their objectives. 
Societies that are wedded to fantasising worst cases soon learn to live them. 
Commentators often associate current military action and anti-
terrorist policies with a narrow neo-conservative agenda promoted by Bush 
and a small circle of ideologues. However, what this analysis overlooks is 
that these policies draw on cultural resources that influence attitudes towards 
uncertainty and risk in general. Fear entrepreneurs promoting campaigns 
around public health issues, child safety, or global warming are equally 
responsible for encouraging the expansion of the empire of the unknown. 
The devaluation of knowledge and the enthronement of ignorance are 
systematically conveyed through policy statements and popular culture. 
Speculation and worse-case thinking resonate with a cultural imagination 
that feels so uncomfortable engaging with uncertainty. Indeed, the readiness 
with which today’s elites are prepared to defer to the unknown is evidence of 
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a pervasive sense of cultural pessimism.  
7 Precautionary culture 
By all objective accounts, it is difficult to explain why Western societies 
should feel so overwhelmed by the condition of vulnerability. Compared 
with the past, people living in Western societies have less familiarity with 
physical pain, suffering, debilitating disease, poverty, and death than 
previously. Western societies enjoy what is by historical standards a high 
level of stability and relative prosperity. Critics of the precautionary culture 
note that: 
By any historical measure, Americans are particularly safe. And we live in an 
especially safe neighbourhood. The sorts of security threats that plagued nations 
since their invention, indeed that necessitated their creation – invasion and civil war 
– are unthinkable here.50
And yet despite an unprecedented level of stability and prosperity, 
contemporary culture continually communicates the idea that humanity is 
confronted by powerful destructive forces that threaten our everyday 
existence. Despite a  
century of extraordinary successes in public health: we complain of more symptoms, 
spend more days in bed and rate our health as worse than we did 40 years or even 80 
years ago.51
Of course, the perception of safety is an existential rather than an objective 
fact. Social scientists know that whether people feel safe or insecure is to a 
considerable extent a matter of subjective judgement. Surveys show that 
young men are far less likely to be worried about crime than are elderly 
women. Yet crime statistics indicate that elderly women suffer far lower 
levels of victimisation than young men. A society’s sense of safety is also 
not directly an outcome of the statistical incidence of physical threats. It is 
widely known that people in prosperous societies living in relatively 
privileged circumstances can feel unsafe and insecure. Individuals who are 
freed from the grinding routine of day-to-day survival can shift their concern 
from being worried about hunger and chronic disease to a preoccupation 
with their emotional well-being. 
In contemporary society, we can never feel safe or healthy enough. 
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With every advance in medical science, communities demand an even higher 
standard of health. It is widely recognised that contemporary society regards 
safety as an end in itself and tends to look upon failures in safety regimes as 
unacceptable. The 21st-century obsession with safety has become so 
pervasive that in the UK some officials have warned that ‘enough is enough 
– it is time to turn the tide’. One report has called for a campaign to 
emphasise the ‘importance of resilience, self-reliance, freedom, innovation 
and a spirit of adventure in today’s society’.52 However, such pleas are 
overwhelmed by powerful cultural forces that insist that people can never be 
safe enough. Consequently, safety and the attitude of caution are now treated 
as inherently positive values across the entire political spectrum. According 
to this ethos of safety, even the term ‘accident’ is now regarded as 
inconsistent with contemporary Western values. Public health officials often 
claim that most injuries suffered by people are preventable and that to 
attribute such an event to an accident is irresponsible. The American 
emergency medicine establishment has been in the forefront of the campaign 
to expunge the word ‘accident’ from its vocabulary.53
Safety consciousness is not simply the direct consequence of the 
growth of prosperity. Society’s obsession with safety has also gained 
momentum through the growth of scepticism towards innovation, change, 
and experimentation. Throughout modern times, people looked to medicine, 
science, and technology to make their lives safer. They still do, of course. 
But there is now a powerful mood of suspicion towards innovation and 
change. The very term ‘human intervention’ has acquired negative 
connotations. Terms like ‘human impact’, ‘human intervention’, and 
‘ecological footprint’ convey a negative sense of folly and destruction. 
Human intervention has always been associated with the belief that its 
positive consequences outweighed its downside. This modernist orientation 
has given way to a more pessimistic account wherein human intervention is 
associated with loss as much as gain, and the former is  increasingly seen to 
outweigh the latter. Rather than serving as a solution to our problems, new 
technology is often indicted for its potential to increase the power of human 
destructiveness. Former American Vice-President Al Gore expressed this 
concern when he warned that the ‘power of technologies now at our disposal 
vastly magnifies the impact each individual can have on the natural world’.54
Western societies have become so obsessed with safety that virtually 
every human experience comes with a health warning. It is not simply 
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children’s playgrounds and schools that have become dominated by the 
ethos of safety for its own sake. Even organisations such as the police and 
the army have become subject to the dictates of health and safety. As a 
result, both of these institutions are becoming increasingly risk averse. One 
British journalist has noted that the police rarely venture out, and even when 
they are confronted with a serious situation they rarely take risks. In one 
case, armed police stood for 15 days besieging a London home, only 
venturing in after the hostage had escaped by his own efforts and the lone 
gunman perished in the fire that he started.55 The ethos of safety has also 
become institutionalised within the military. Army commanders have to 
draw up risk assessments for every dimension of their soldiers’ training. 
Some have given up testing soldiers to the limit lest they inadvertently 
contravene health and safety rules.56 General Sir Michael Rose, former head 
of the SAS, has spoken out about the destructive consequences of risk 
aversion and the ethos of safety for the morale of the military. He has 
denounced the ‘moral cowardice’ that has encouraged what he describes as 
the ‘most catastrophic collapse’ of military ethos in recent history.57 If 
anything, the decline of the warrior ethos is far more comprehensive within 
the US military. One analyst believes that risk aversion has undermined the 
effectiveness of the US military. ‘As emphasis on risk avoidance filters 
down the chain of command, junior commanders and their soldiers become 
aware that low-risk behaviour is expected and act accordingly’, he notes.58
Unlike some institutions in society, the military cannot survive 
without taking risks. However, the military values associated with the 
warrior ethos face a challenge from potent cultural influences that negate 
risk-taking behaviour. Despite the many Hollywood action-packed movies 
that celebrate heroism and bravery, there is little cultural valuation for risk-
taking military behaviour. The military is not immune to the influence of 
precautionary culture. Prevailing norms towards health and safety decry risk-
taking behaviour. A culture that shows a low threshold towards losses in 
everyday life is unlikely to possess the capacity to celebrate risk-taking 
behaviour within military institutions. That is also one reason that the status 
and the authority of the military have declined. The elites of society have 
distanced themselves from military values, and the military and their 
participation in this institution have significantly diminished. Even the 
mainstream of society has become estranged from military values. As two 
radical critics remark,  
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the representative image of the U.S. soldier is no longer that of a John Wayne, and 
more important, the profiles of U.S. soldiers do not resemble the profiles of the U.S. 
citizenry.59   
In Britain too, fighting in a war is increasingly outsourced to private 
contractors, foreign mercenaries, and the most economically disadvantaged 
section of society. 
One of the most striking manifestations of society’s estrangement 
from military and warrior values is the ascendancy of a powerful mood of 
casualty aversion. The military are continually concerned about the ability of 
the public to tolerate casualties. Casualty aversion appears to have 
influenced the 1989 decision of the US Department of Defense to prohibit 
media coverage of deceased military personnel returning from Dover Air 
Force Base.60 One critic of what he calls America’s ‘elite casualty phobia’ 
has noted that in many recent military engagements – Bosnia and Kosovo – 
‘US ground forces were deliberately withheld from participation’ and that in 
Afghanistan local ground forces were often used to hold down casualties.61
The significance attached to safety and loss avoidance not only 
undermines the capacity of Western societies to deal with violent opponents 
but it also makes them uniquely vulnerable to the risk of terrorism. 
Preoccupation with safety and the constant acknowledgement of 
vulnerability acts as an invitation to terrorism. As Homer-Dixon observed, 
‘our increased vulnerability makes us more risk-averse, while terrorists have 
become more powerful and more tolerant of risk’. He added that as a result 
‘terrorists have significant leverage to hurt us’.62 These different cultural 
attitudes have important implications for the way that the War on Terror is 
played out globally. It appears that Western concerns towards avoiding 
losses encourage the response of terror. 
The powerful sense of vulnerability and insecurity that prevails in 
the Western world is frequently blamed on a rapidly changing globalised 
world that produces unprecedented levels of uncertainty. As Tobias 
Arnoldussen argues in this issue of Erasmus Law Review, vulnerability and 
uncertainty are ‘absolute presuppositions of precautionary logic’.63 Virtually 
every official document and expert statement on the problem of terrorism 
repeats a version of this mantra. ‘It has become something of a cliché that 
the beginning of the twenty-first century is marked by increasing complexity 
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and uncertainty, on a national, regional and international scale’ begins a 
report arguing a case for a new national security strategy for the UK.64 Yet 
the cliché of unprecedented level of uncertainty is rarely contested. 
However, ideas about certainty and uncertainty are not founded on objective 
facts but are shaped by cultural attitudes towards the future. Humanity 
actually knows quite a lot about the world. There are some threats that lurk 
in the background and occasionally catch us unaware, but most of the time, 
at least by the standards of historical experience, we live in a relatively 
stable world. What makes us feel uncertain are not the uncontrollable forces 
unleashed by globalisation but our lack of clarity about our place in the 
world. Concern about risk and safety express the difficulties that Western 
culture has in making sense of change in an uncertain world. The response of 
precaution is an attempt to deal with this predicament. 
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